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OPINION OF THE COURT

BRODY, District Judge,
Plaintiff, David Venen, appeals from the district
court's grant of summary judgment for the defendant United States
in this suit for damages Venen claims resulted from unauthorized
tax collection actions, failure to release a tax lien, and
unauthorized disclosure of tax return information.

This appeal

presents two issues.
The first issue is whether the plaintiff exhausted his
administrative remedies before seeking relief from the district
court for damages from unauthorized tax collection actions and
failure to release a tax lien.

We hold that plaintiff's failure

to comply with the regulations constitutes a failure to exhaust
and, therefore, the grant of summary judgment on these claims is
proper.
The second issue arises in the claim for unauthorized
disclosure of tax return information.

Although the Tax Code

generally prohibits the disclosure of tax return information, it
authorizes disclosure when the tax return information relates to
collection activity, including a levy on assets to satisfy an
outstanding tax liability.

Plaintiff contends that the levies

against his assets were unlawful and therefore the information
relating to the levies was impermissibly disclosed.
is whether it is relevant that the levy is unlawful.

The question
We hold

that it is not and, therefore, that the grant of summary judgment
on the disclosure claim is proper.
28 U.S.C. § 1291 gives us jurisdiction.
I.
Venen's Amended Complaint asserts claims for
unauthorized tax collection actions under 26 U.S.C. § 7433
(Counts I, III and IV); failure to release a tax lien under 26
U.S.C. § 7432 (Counts II and V); and unauthorized disclosure of
tax return information under 26 U.S.C. § 7431 (Count VI).

The

district court granted summary judgment for defendant on Counts
I-V on the ground that Venen had failed to exhaust administrative
remedies as required by sections 7432 and 7433.

The court also

granted summary judgment for defendant on Count VI, holding that
the disclosures did not give rise to damages under section 7431
because the Internal Revenue Service of the United States (IRS)
made the disclosures to obtain information to collect taxes.
The district court's grant of summary judgment is
subject to plenary review.

American Medical Imaging Corp. v. St.

Paul Fire ad Marine Ins. Co., 949 F.2d 690, 692 (3d Cir. 1991).
Summary judgment is appropriate where "the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
56(c).

Fed. R. Civ. P.

Defendants are entitled to summary judgment only if no

reasonable resolution of the conflicting evidence and the
inferences that could be drawn from that evidence could result in
a judgment for plaintiffs.
U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477

"[T]he mere existence of a scintilla of

evidence in support of plaintiffs['] position will be
insufficient[;] there must be evidence on which the jury could
reasonably find for the plaintiff[s]."

Id. at 252.

Since the

district court made no findings of fact, we will state the facts
from the record viewed in the light most favorable to Venen, the
non-moving party.
Venen's claims result from efforts by the IRS to
collect the federal income taxes he owed for a ten-year period,
from 1977 through 1986.

In July 1979, Venen filed his tax

returns for years 1977 and 1978.

In March 1985, Venen filed

federal tax returns for years 1979 through 1983.

Shortly

thereafter, Venen entered into an agreement with the IRS to pay
his taxes in installments.

The installment agreement covered tax

years 1977 and 1978 as well as 1979 through 1983.1
On November 27, 1987, while Venen was complying with
the installment agreement, the IRS issued to Venen's employer the
1

Appendix at 52a (Defendant's Statement of Material Facts
as to Which it Contends There is no Genuine Issue ¶ 3). The
record does not contain the actual installment agreement.

first of four disputed Notices of Levy to collect taxes.

This

Notice of Levy was for the collection of taxes for the years 1980
through 1984 and 1986.

After that notice was issued but before

the IRS issued a second notice, Venen met with IRS Agent Argento,
who placed the account on "non-collectible status."

Appendix at

118a (Affidavit of David Venen ¶ 10).
On September 25, 1990 the IRS issued a second Notice of
Levy to Venen's employer for tax years 1977 and 1978.

In October

1990, IRS Agent Gregorakis "reviewed the file at Venen's request
and told Venen that the levy should not have been issued in view
of Venen's 'non-collectible' status, apologized, and said the
levy would be released."
12).

Appendix at 118a (Venen Affidavit ¶

On January 15, 1991, the IRS issued a third Notice of Levy

to Venen's employer for tax years 1977 and 1978, and a fourth on
April 17, 1991 to his employer and to his bank, for tax years
1977 through 1984 and 1986.
After "numerous negotiations" between Venen and the IRS
to release the fourth levy, Agent Gregorakis told Venen that no
further administrative remedies were available.
(Venen Affidavit ¶¶ 16 & 18).

Appendix at 119a

On June 27, 1991 Venen's attorney

confirmed that representation in a letter to Agent Gregorakis
stating "It is my understanding that you stated all
administrative remedies have been exhausted and should we wish to
pursue the matter further [Venen's] only recourse would be to
file a civil suit against the Internal Revenue Service."

Appendix at 214a (Letter from Attorney Peter Suwak to Agent
Gregorakis).

The letter asks Agent Gregorakis to respond if that

understanding is incorrect.

Id.

Agent Gregorakis did not

respond and does not recall receiving the letter.
Venen's complaint is based on improper collection
activities, including breach of the installment agreement by
attempts to levy on Venen's wages and bank account.

Count VI is

based on improper disclosures relating to those activities,
specifically disclosures contained in the notices of levy.
A.
In Counts I through V, Venen asserts claims under 26
U.S.C. § 7432 for failure to release a tax lien and under 26
U.S.C. § 7433 for unauthorized tax collection activities.2
2

Both

Section 7432 provides:
(a) If any officer or employee of the Internal Revenue
Service knowingly, or by reason of negligence fails to
release a lien under section 6325 on property of the
taxpayer, such taxpayer may bring a civil action for
damages against the United States in a district court
of the United States.
. . .
(d) Limitations. -(1) Requirement that administrative remedies be
exhausted. -- A judgment for damages shall not be
awarded . . . unless the court determines that the
plaintiff has exhausted the administrative
remedies available to such plaintiff within the
Internal Revenue Service.
Section 7433 provides:
(a) In general. -- If, in connection with any
collection of Federal tax with respect to a taxpayer,
any officer or employee of the Internal Revenue Service
recklessly or intentionally disregards any provision of

Tax Code provisions require a plaintiff to exhaust administrative
remedies before filing a civil suit.
and 7433(d).
jurisdiction.

See 26 U.S.C. §§ 7432(d)

Failure to exhaust deprives the court of
Information Resources, Inc. v. United States, 950

F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1992).
Treasury regulations specify the administrative
remedies to exhaust.

Administrative remedies for section 7432

are set forth in Treasury Regulation § 301.7432-1; remedies for
section 7433 are found in Treasury Regulation § 301.7433-1.

Both

regulations apply to "civil actions . . . filed in federal
district court after January 30, 1992."

Because Venen filed suit

September 25, 1992, the regulations apply to this case.

See

McGarvin v. United States, 93-1 U.S.T.C. ¶ 50,325 (E.D. Mo.),
aff'd 12 F.3d 1102 (8th Cir. 1993).
An administrative claim for failure to release a tax
lien must include the taxpayer's identifying information, a copy
of the notice of lien affecting the property, the grounds for the
(..continued)
this title, or any regulation promulgated under this
title, such taxpayer may bring a civil action for
damages against the United States in a district court
of the United States. Except as provided in section
7432, such civil action shall be the exclusive remedy
for recovering damages resulting from such actions.
. . .
(d) Limitations. -(1) Requirement that administrative remedies be
exhausted. -- A judgment for damages shall not be
awarded . . . unless the court determines that the
plaintiff has exhausted the administrative
remedies available to such plaintiff within the
Internal Revenue Service.

claim, a description of injuries, and the amount of the claim.
See Treas. Reg. § 301.7432-1(f).

An administrative claim for

unauthorized collection actions also must include identifying
information, the grounds for the claim, a description of
injuries, and the amount of the claim.

See Treas. Reg. §

301.7433-1(e).
Both regulations require a taxpayer to make the claim
for relief "in writing to the district director . . . in the
district in which the taxpayer currently resides."
§§ 301.7432-1(f); 301.7433-1(e).

Treas. Reg.

The Seventh Circuit has held

that a letter addressed to the revenue officer listed on the
notice of levy did not comply with a similar treasury regulation
requiring a written request "addressed to the district director."
Amwest Surety Insurance Co. v. United States, No. 93-2915 (7th
Cir. July 1, 1994) (considering Treas. Reg. § 301.6343-1(b)(2)).
The failure to comply deprives a court of jurisdiction even
though the IRS has received actual notice of the claim and never
informs the taxpayer of the proper procedures.

Amwest, slip op.

at 11.
Venen failed to comply with the regulations under
sections 7432 and 7433.

He argues that the letter to Agent

Gregorakis explaining that he understands he has exhausted his
administrative remedies satisfies the regulations.

Venen's

letter is inadequate to trigger administrative review both
because it is addressed to a revenue agent and not to the

district director, see Amwest, slip op. at 11, and because it
does not specify the grounds for relief, see Treas. Reg. §§
301.7432-1(f) and 301.7433-1(e).

Agent Gregorakis' alleged

failure to respond to the letter does not excuse Venen.

As the

Seventh Circuit held, a failure to petition the IRS correctly is
a failure to exhaust even if the IRS does not inform a taxpayer
of proper procedures.

Amwest, slip op. at 11.

Finally, Venen argues that he is excused from the
exhaustion requirement because exhaustion would be futile.

Venen

bases his futility argument on Information Resources, Inc. v.
United States, 950 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1992), in which the Fifth
Circuit held that then-applicable administrative remedies under
section 7432 were excused because the IRS already had provided
the only relief authorized by the remedies--release of the lien.
Information Resources, 950 F.2d at 1127.

Current remedies under

section 7432, effective since the Fifth Circuit decided
Information Resources, provide that administrative relief may
include damages.

Administrative relief under the other section

at issue here, section 7433 also may include damages.
Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7432-1(f) and 301.7433-1.

See 26

The IRS has not

awarded or denied Venen damages on his claims.

Therefore, the

IRS has not granted all available administrative relief and
exhaustion would not be futile.
The district court's grant of summary judgment on
Counts I-V is, therefore, affirmed.

B.
In Count VI, Venen seeks damages under 26 U.S.C. §
7431, which provides a civil cause of action for knowing or
negligent disclosure of tax return information in violation of 26
U.S.C. § 6103.3

Title 26 U.S.C. § 6103 establishes the principle

that tax return information is confidential and may not be
disclosed except in certain situations, including those
enumerated in section 6103(k).
To prevail in his claim under section 7431, Venen must
"demonstrate [1] a violation of Section 6103, and [2] that such a
violation resulted from knowing or negligent conduct."

Elias v.

United States, No. CV 90-0432, 1990 WL 264722, at *3 (C.D. Cal.
Dec. 21, 1990), aff'd 974 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1992).

Because we

hold that Venen has not demonstrated a violation of section 6103,
we do not reach the second requirement.
Section 6103(a) states that "[r]eturns and return
information shall be confidential, and except as authorized by
this title . . . no officer or employee of the United States

3

Section 7431 provides:
(a)
(1) . . . If any officer or employee of the United
States knowingly, or by reason of negligence, discloses
any return or return information with respect to a
taxpayer in violation of any provision of section 6103,
such taxpayer may bring a civil action for damages
against the United States in a district court of the
United States.

. . . shall disclose any return or return information."
U.S.C. § 6103(a).

26

Section 6103(k)(6) contains the authorization

relevant to this case.

It provides that:

An internal revenue officer or employee may, in
connection with his official duties relating to any
audit, collection activity or civil or criminal tax
investigation or any other offense under the internal
revenue laws, disclose return information to the extent
that such disclosure is necessary in obtaining
information which is not otherwise reasonably
available, with respect to the correct determination of
tax, liability for tax, or the amount to be collected
or with respect to the enforcement of any other
provision of this title. Such disclosures shall be
made only in such situations and under such conditions
as the Secretary may prescribe by regulation.
26 U.S.C. § 6103(k)(6).

Regulations promulgated under the

provision permit disclosure to obtain information necessary "to
apply the provisions of the Code relating to establishment of
liens against [the taxpayer's] assets, or levy on, or seizure, or
sale of, the assets to satisfy any [outstanding] liability."
Treas. Reg. § 301.6103(k)(6)-1(b)(6).
Venen's section 7431 claim is based on disclosures of
return information in the four contested Notices of Levy.

There

is no dispute that these disclosures were necessary to effect the
levies and that information may be properly disclosed under
section 6103(k)(6) "to effect a . . . levy."

Elias, at *4.

Venen maintains, however, that the disclosures violated section
6103(k)(6) because the underlying levies were unlawful.

He

contends that the levies were unlawful because they were issued

while he was complying with an installment agreement and his
account was on non-collectible status.

Venen's factual

contention that the levies were unlawful is material only if an
authorized disclosure of information under section 6103(k)(6) is
converted into an unauthorized one when the disclosure occurs in
the process of establishing an unlawful levy.
Courts are split on whether the validity of the
underlying levy affects disclosure under section 6103.

One line

of cases holds that "whether a disclosure is authorized under
§ 6103 is in no way dependent upon the validity of the underlying
summons, lien or levy."

Elias, 1990 WL 264722 at *5.

See, e.g.,

Tomlinson v. United States, 1991 WL 338328 (W.D. Wash. 1991)
(validity of lien irrelevant), aff'd 977 F.2d 591 (9th Cir.
1992); Flippo v. United States, 670 F. Supp. 638, 643 (W.D.N.C.
1987) (permissible to disclose information under mistaken
impression that taxes are due), aff'd 849 F.2d 604 (4th Cir.
1988); Bleavins v. United States, 807 F. Supp. 487, 489 (C.D.
Ill. 1992) ("§ 7431 does not apply to disputed merits of an
assessment"), aff'd 998 F.2d 1016 (7th Cir. 1993).
Another line of cases does consider the validity of the
levy to be relevant to disclosure under section 6103.

The Eighth

Circuit, without analysis, concludes that disclosure in pursuance
of an unlawful levy violates section 6103(k)(6).

Rorex v.

Traynor, 771 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1985) (finding levy unlawful due
to compliance with installment agreement).

See also Maisano v.

United States, 908 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1990) (although not
specifically linking the two, considering validity of the
underlying tax liens and levies before finding IRS authorized to
disclose under § 6103); William E. Schrambling Accountancy Corp.
v. United States, 689 F. Supp. 1001, 1006 (N.D. Cal. 1988)
(following Rorex rule that improper notice of levy is basis for
liability), rev'd on other grounds 937 F.2d 1485 (9th Cir. 1991)
(reversing because information already public record and
therefore not protected by § 6103), cert. denied 112 S. Ct. 956
(1992).
We join those cases that decline to consider the
validity of the underlying levy in deciding whether the IRS has
disclosed in violation of section 6103.

The history of section

6103 indicates that Congress enacted the provision to regulate a
discrete sphere of IRS activity--information handling.

Prior to

the amendment of section 6103 in the Tax Reform Act of 1976, tax
returns were public records but subject to inspection and
disclosure only under special circumstances, including upon order
of the President.
Cir. 1979).

United States v. Bacheler, 611 F.2d 443 (3d

Under the former provision, the IRS provided

extensive tax return information to various governmental
agencies.

S. Rep. No. 94-938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 317 (1976),

reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3746.
During the amendment process in 1976, Congress
expressed concern that those disclosures "breache[d] a reasonable

expectation of privacy on the part of the American citizen with
respect to such information."

Id.

The breach threatened to

undermine our voluntary tax assessment system.

Id.

By the

amendment of section 6103, Congress sought to restore taxpayer
confidence in the privacy of return information.
264722 at *4.

Elias, 1990 WL

The revised provision balances the taxpayer's

expectation of privacy with the government's need to collect
taxes by making information confidential "except in those limited
situations delineated in the newly amended section 6103 where it
was determined that disclosure was warranted."

S. Rep. No. 94-

938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 318 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3747.

The Tax Reform Act also contained an

enforcement mechanism for section 6103.

Section 7217, the

predecessor statute to section 7431, provided a civil damages
remedy for knowing or negligent disclosures in violation of
section 6103.

26 U.S.C. 7217 (Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1202(e)

(1976)).4
In a claim such as the present one based on an improper
levy, the concern is not improper information handling but rather
improper collection activity.

Collection activity is a separate

sphere of IRS activity governed by a separate body of law.

For

example, the Tax Code specifies procedures for assessing

4

In 1982, Congress replaced section 7217 with section
7431, which remedies the same conduct but names the United States
rather than the IRS employee as the proper defendant. Pub. L.
No. 97-248, § 357(a) (1982).

deficiencies and for levying against property.
(tax liens) and 6331-6334 (tax levies).

See §§ 6321-6326

The enforcement

mechanism for collection provisions is 26 U.S.C. § 7433.

It

creates a civil cause of action for damages "[i]f, in connection
with any collection of Federal tax with respect to a taxpayer,
any officer or employee of the Internal Revenue Service
recklessly or intentionally disregards any provision of this
title, or any regulation promulgated under this title" and is the
"exclusive remedy for recovering damages resulting from such
actions."

26 U.S.C. § 7433.

Venen did bring claims under

section 7433 in Counts I, III, and IV, which were barred by his
failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
These two bodies of law must remain distinct.

Section

6103 and its attendant damages provision, section 7431, were
meant to regulate only one sphere of activity--information
handling--and were "not intended to interfere with . . .
collection actions."
section 7431).

Flippo, 670 F. Supp. at 641 (describing

Thus, the propriety of the underlying collection

action, in this instance the validity of the levy, is irrelevant
to whether disclosure is authorized under section 6103 and the
basis for liability under section 7431.
The history and structure of the Tax Code's damages
scheme compels this result.

Congress reacted to concerns about

violations of privacy in the Tax Reform Act of 1976 by protecting
return information and creating a damages remedy for unauthorized

disclosures that are the result of knowing or negligent conduct.
See 26 U.S.C. §§ 6103 and 7217 (now § 7431).

Congress addressed

concerns about improper collection actions in 1988, when it
enacted section 7433.

The legislative history of that provision

sheds light on the scope of section 7431.

The House Report

states that, under current law in 1988, "[t]axpayers d[id] not
have a specific right to bring an action against the Government
for damages sustained due to unreasonable actions taken by an IRS
employee."

H. Rep. No. 100-1104, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 228

(1988) reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5288.

That statement

suggests that section 7431, by its incorporation of section 6103,
did not reach the conduct remedied by section 7433--improper
collection actions.
Venen's interpretation of section 7431 would undermine
the culpability requirement of section 7433.

Although the Senate

Amendment for Section 7433 proposed a cause of action to
encompass careless, reckless or intentional unauthorized
collection actions, section 7433 as enacted provides a claim only
for reckless or intentional actions.

1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5289.

Venen's position would allow a taxpayer to premise liability
under section 7431 on an unauthorized collection action that
fails to meet the "reckless or intentional" culpability standard.
Venen argues that disclosure in the course of an unauthorized
collection action, such as an unlawful levy, violates section
6103 and may create liability under section 7431.

Thus, Venen

factors unlawful levies into the analysis under section 7431
without imposing the requirement of section 7433 that the levy
result from reckless or intentional conduct.

This reasoning

opens the door for a taxpayer to base a section 7431 claim on
negligent or even nonculpable conduct that leads to an unlawful
levy.

A taxpayer would gain through the back door of section

7431 what was specifically denied under section 7433.5
The plain language of section 6103 also mandates the
conclusion that the lawfulness of the levy is irrelevant to
whether disclosure is authorized.

The provision requires only

that information be disclosed for one of the specified purposes-here, "in connection with . . . collection activity . . . to
obtain information . . . with respect to the correct
determination of tax, liability for tax, or the amount to be
collected or with respect to the enforcement of any other
provision of this title."

§ 6103(k)(6).

The regulations

specifically authorize disclosure "to apply the provisions of the
Code relating to establishment of liens against such assets, or
levy on, or seizure, or sale of, the assets to satisfy any
[outstanding] liability."

Treas. Reg. § 301.6103(k)(6)-1(b)(6).

Neither the statute nor the regulations on their face authorize

5

Some courts that do look behind collection activity seem
to have responded to this problem by applying the "knowing or
negligent" culpability requirement of section 7431 to the
unlawful collection activity. See, e.g., Chandler, 687 F. Supp.
at 1520. Even under that analysis taxpayers recover for less
than reckless or intentional conduct.

the court to consider whether the collection activity itself is
proper.6

Cf. Creighton R. Meland, Jr., Note, Omnibus Taxpayers'

Bill of Rights Act:

Taxpayers' Remedy or Political Placebo?

86

Mich. L. Rev. 1787, 1812 n.162 (1988).
Finally, the result urged by Venen, making unlawful
levies the basis for liability under section 7431, might impede
the efficient and orderly collection of taxes.

Aware of possible

liability, an IRS agent might feel the need to check the validity
of the underlying levy before performing the routine task of
establishing a levy to collect taxes.

Such a restraint could

place an undue burden on collection activity.
The IRS disclosed Venen's tax return information in
pursuit of a levy.

The IRS, therefore, has not violated section

6103 and is not liable under section 7431.
Accordingly, the district court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of defendant on Count VI is affirmed.

6

The Rorex court was concerned that this reasoning
"open[s] a significant loophole" in section 7431: An IRS agent
could disclose information "simply by making the disclosure in
the form of a notice of levy." Rorex, 771 F.2d at 386. One
court addressed this concern by holding that "[t]he provisions of
section 6301(k)(6) [sic] do not authorize disclosures made after
the government admits that the underlying assessment was in
error." Husby v. United States, 672 F. Supp. 442 (N.D. Cal.
1987). Under our reasoning, because a court may not look behind
a levy, section 6103 would authorize disclosure to establish a
levy even if the IRS agent knows that there is no tax liability
or that the levy is an improper means of collection. In that
circumstance, the taxpayer still has a remedy in section 7433 for
reckless or intentional unauthorized collection activity.

C.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district
court will be affirmed.

